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Abstract. For counting points of Jacobians of genus 2 curves dened
over large prime elds, the best known method is a variant of Schoof's
algorithm. We present several improvements on the algorithms described
by Gaudry and Harley in 2000. In particular we rebuild the symmetry
that had been broken by the use of Cantor's division polynomials and
design a faster division by 2 and a division by 3. Combined with the
algorithm by Matsuo, Chao and Tsujii, our implementation can count
the points on a Jacobian of size 164 bits within about one week on a PC.
1 Introduction
Genus 2 hyperelliptic curves provide an interesting alternative to elliptic curves
for the design of discrete-log based cryptosystems. Indeed, for a similar security,
the key or signature lengths are the same as for elliptic curves and furthermore
the size of the base eld in which the computations take place is twice smaller.
During the last years, eorts in improving the group law algorithms made these
cryptosystems quite competitive [19, 25].
To ensure the security of the system, it is required to have a group of large
prime order. Until recently, for the Jacobian of a genus 2 curve, only specic
constructions provided curves with known Jacobian order, namely the complex
multiplication (CM) method [34] and the Koblitz curves. These curves have a
very special structure; although nobody knows if they are weaker than general
curves, it is pertinent to consider random curves as well. This raises the problem
of point-counting: given a random curve, nd the group order of its Jacobian.
With today's state of the art, the complexity of the point counting task in
genus 2 highly depends on the size of the characteristic of the base eld: in short,
the smaller the characteristic, the easier the task of point counting (\easy" means
fast and does not mean that the theoretical tools are simple).
In the case of genus 2 curves in small characteristic p, the point counting
problem was recently solved using p-adic methods [31, 23, 20]. The particular
case where p = 2 is in fact treated almost as quickly as in genus 1. Unfortunately,
these dramatic improvements do not apply when p becomes too large (say, a few
thousands [10]).
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For large p, the best known algorithms are variants of Schoof's algorithm,
theoretical descriptions of which can be found in [26, 18, 1, 16]. In 2000, Gaudry
and Harley [11] designed and implemented the rst practical genus 2 Schoof
algorithm, making use of Cantor's division polynomials [8]. To reach reasonable
sizes, however, it was necessary to combine the Schoof approach with a Pollard
lambda method. Their record was a random genus 2 curve over a prime eld
of size about 10
19
, thus too small to be used in a cryptosystem. For \medium
characteristic", they also proposed to use the Cartier-Manin operator to get
additional information that can be combined with others. Therefore, for medium
characteristic p (say 10
9
, see [5]), point counting is easier than for very large p.
We mentioned that in the non-small characteristic case, once the group or-
der has been computed modulo some large integer, the computation is nished
using a Pollard lambda method. Matsuo, Chao and Tsujii [21] proposed a Baby-
step/Giant-step algorithm that speeds up this last phase. With this device and
using the Cartier-Manin trick, they performed a point counting computation of
cryptographical size for a medium characteristic eld.
In this paper, we improve on the methods of [11], so that, combined with the
algorithm of [21], we can reach cryptographical size over prime elds. Our im-
provements are concerned with the construction and the manipulation of torsion
elements in the Schoof-like algorithm of [11]. The impact of these improvements
is asymptotically by a constant factor, but they yield signicant speed-up in
practice for the size of interest in cryptography. We now summarize them:
Our rst contribution is the reintroduction of symmetries that were lost
in [11]. Indeed, the use of Cantor's division polynomials to construct torsion
elements is very eÆcient, but the resulting divisor is given as a sum of points
instead of in Mumford representation. Therefore a factor of 2 in the degrees of
the polynomials that are manipulated is lost. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we give
algorithms to save this factor of 2 in the degrees.
In [11], it is proposed to build 2
k
-torsion elements using a halving algorithm
based on Grobner basis computations. Our second contribution is a faster divi-
sion by 2, using a better representation of the system; in the same spirit we show
that a division by 3 can also be done: this is described in Section 4. Another
practical improvement is the ubiquitous use of an explicit action on the roots
coming from the group law to speed-up the factorizations that occur at dierent
stages. We explain it in details in the case of the division by 2 in Section 3.4.
To illustrate and to test the performance of our improvements, we imple-
mented them in Magma or NTL and mixed them with the algorithm of [21] and
an early abort strategy. Our main outcome is the rst construction of secure
random curves of genus 2 over a prime eld, as we obtained Jacobians of prime
order of size about 2
164
.
2 Generalities
In this work, p denotes a xed odd prime, F
p
is the nite eld with p elements,
and C is a genus 2 curve dened by the equation y
2
= f(x), where f is a
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squarefree monic polynomial in F
p
[X ] of degree 5. The main object we consider
is the Jacobian J(C) of C. We handle elements of J(C) through their Mumford
representation: each element of J(C) can be uniquely represented by a pair of
polynomials hu(x); v(x)i, where u is monic of degree at most 2, v is of degree less
than the degree of u, and u divides v
2
  f . The degree of the u-polynomial in
Mumford's representation is called the weight of a divisor. If K is an extension
eld of F
p
, we may distinguish the curves dened on K and F
p
, by denoting
them C=K and C=F
p
; the Jacobians are correspondingly denoted by J(C=K) and
J(C=F
p
). For precise denitions and algorithms for the group law, we refer to
[22] and [7, 19].
Let F
p
be an algebraic closure of F
p
and let us consider the Frobenius endo-
morphism on J(C=F
p
) denoted by . By Weil's theorem (see [24]), the character-
istic polynomial (T ) of  has the form (T ) = T
4
  s
1
T
3
+ s
2
T
2
  ps
1
T + p
2
,
where s
1
and s
2
are integers such that js
1
j  4
p
p and js
2
j  6p. Furthermore
#J(C) = (1) = p
2
+ 1  s
1
(p+ 1) + s
2
.
In point-counting algorithms based on Schoof's idea [27], the torsion ele-
ments of J(C) play an important role. If N is a positive integer, the subgroup
of N -torsion elements of J(C=F
p
) is a nite group denoted by J(C)[N ]; it is iso-
morphic to (Z=NZ)
4
and has the structure of a free Z=NZ-module of dimension
4 (see [24]). Furthermore, the characteristic polynomial of the restriction of  to
J(C)[N ] is (T ) mod N . Applying this to dierent small primes or prime powers
leads to the genus 2 Schoof algorithm that is sketched in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Sketch of a genus 2 Schoof algorithm
1. For suÆciently many small primes or prime powers `:
(a) Let L = f(s
1
; s
2
); s
1
; s
2
2 [0; `  1]g.
(b) While #L > 1 do
{ Construct a new `-torsion divisor D;
{ Eliminate those elements (s
1
; s
2
) in L such that

4
(D)  s
1

3
(D) + s
2

2
(D)  (ps
1
mod `)(D) + (p
2
mod `)D 6= 0
(c) Deduce (T ) mod ` from the remaining pair in L.
2. Deduce (T ) from the pairs (`; (T ) mod `) by Chinese remaindering, or using the
algorithm of [21].
Our contribution is to improve the rst part of the algorithm, the construc-
tion of `-torsion divisors; the computations for small primes and prime powers
are respectively described in Sections 3 and 4.
We will frequently make genericity assumptions on the curve C and its torsion
divisors. We assume that C is chosen randomly among genus 2 curves dened over
a large eld F
p
, so we can expect that with high probability, such assumptions are
satised. The cases when our assumptions fail should require special treatments,
which are not developed here.
For the complexity estimates, we denote byM(d) the number of F
p
-operations
required to multiply two polynomials of degree d dened over F
p
. We make the
classical assumptions on M (see for instance [32, Denition 8.26]). In the sequel,
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if no precise reference is given for an algorithm, then it can be found in [32],
together with a complexity analysis in terms of M.
3 Computation modulo a small prime `
In the classical Schoof algorithm for elliptic curves, a formal `-torsion point is
used: the computations are made with a point P = (x; y), where x cancels the
`-th division polynomial  
`
and y is linked to x by the equation of the curve. In
other words, we work in a rank 2 polynomial algebra quotiented by two relations:
F
p
[x; y]=( 
`
(x); y
2
  (x
3
+ ax+ b)).
In genus 2, we imitate this strategy. According to [18], it is enough to consider
the `-torsion divisors of weight 2 (this is not surprising since a generic divisor has
weight 2). Let thusD be a weight 2 divisor given in Mumford representation,D =
hx
2
+u
1
x+u
0
; v
1
x+v
0
i: Then there exists a radical ideal I
`
of F
p
[U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
]
such that
D 2 J(C)[`] () '(u
1
; u
0
; v
1
; v
0
) = 0; 8' 2 I
`
:
By analogy with elliptic division polynomials, this ideal I
`
is called the `-th divi-
sion ideal. There are `
4
 1 non-zero `-torsion elements, so that I
`
has dimension
0 and degree at most `
4
  1; generically, by the Manin-Mumford conjecture [15,
p. 435], all non-zero torsion divisors have weight 2, so the degree of I
`
is exactly
`
4
  1.
From the computational point of view, a good choice for a generating set of I
`
is a Grobner basis for a lexicographic order. Using the order U
1
< U
0
< V
1
< V
0
,
we can actually predict the shape of this Grobner basis. Indeed, if D is an
`-torsion divisor, then its opposite  D is also `-torsion, so it has the same u-
coordinates, and opposite v-coordinates. Furthermore, we make the genericity
assumption that all the pairs fD; Dg of `-torsion divisors have dierent values
for u
1
. Then, the Grobner basis for the ideal I
`
takes the form
I
`
=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
V
0
  V
1
S
0
(U
1
)
V
2
1
  S
1
(U
1
)
U
0
 R
0
(U
1
)
R
1
(U
1
);
where R
1
is a squarefree polynomial of degree (`
4
  1)=2 and R
0
; S
1
; S
0
are
polynomials of degree at most (`
4
  1)=2   1. If such a Grobner basis for I
`
is known, then it is not diÆcult to imitate Schoof's algorithm, by working in
the quotient algebra F
p
[U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
]=I
`
: Unfortunately, no easy computable
recurrence formulae are known that relate Grobner bases of `-division ideals for
dierent values of `, just like for division polynomials of elliptic curves. Therefore
we shall start with the approach of [11] using Cantor's division polynomials and
show that we can derive eÆciently a multiple of R
1
.
3.1 Cantor's division polynomials
Let us x a prime `. Cantor's division polynomials [8] are polynomials in F
p
[X ],
denoted by d
0
, d
1
, d
2
, e
0
, e
1
, , with the following property: for a divisor P =
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hx  x
P
; y
P
i of weight 1, the multiplication of P by ` in J(C) is given by
[`]P =

x
2
+
d
1
(x
P
)
d
2
(x
P
)
x+
d
0
(x
P
)
d
2
(x
P
)
; y
P

e
1
(x
P
)
(x
P
)
x+
e
0
(x
P
)
(x
P
)

:
These polynomials have respective degrees 2`
2
 1, 2`
2
 2, 2`
2
 3, 3`
2
 2, 3`
2
 3,
3`
2
 2 and are easily computed by means of recurrence formulae. Even if a naive
method is used, the cost of their computation is by far negligible compared to
the subsequent operations.
Now, let D = hx
2
+U
1
x+U
0
; V
1
x+V
0
i be a generic divisor of weight 2, where
U
1
, U
0
, V
1
, V
0
are indeterminates, subject to the condition that x
2
+ U
1
x + U
0
divides (V
1
x+ V
0
)
2
  f . The divisor D can be written as the sum of two weight
1 divisors P
1
= hx  X
1
; Y
1
i and P
2
= hx   X
2
; Y
2
i, where U
1
=  (X
1
+ X
2
),
U
0
= X
1
X
2
, and where Y
1
and Y
2
satisfy V
1
X
1
+ V
0
= Y
1
and V
1
X
2
+ V
0
= Y
2
.
Since D = P
1
+ P
2
, then D is `-torsion if and only if [`]P
1
=  [`]P
2
.
Rewriting this equation using Cantor's division polynomials, we get four
equations that must be satised for D to be `-torsion. Some of these equations
are multiples of X
1
 X
2
: this is an artifact due to the splitting of D into divisors
of weight 1 and if this is the case one should divide out this factor. Hence we
obtain the following system:
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
E
1
(X
1
; X
2
) = (d
1
(X
1
)d
2
(X
2
)  d
1
(X
2
)d
2
(X
1
))=(X
1
 X
2
) = 0;
E
2
(X
1
; X
2
) = (d
0
(X
1
)d
2
(X
2
)  d
0
(X
2
)d
2
(X
1
))=(X
1
 X
2
) = 0;
F
1
(X
1
; X
2
; Y
1
; Y
2
) = Y
1
e
1
(X
1
)e
0
(X
2
) + Y
2
e
1
(X
2
)e
0
(X
1
) = 0;
F
2
(X
1
; X
2
; Y
1
; Y
2
) = Y
1
e
2
(X
1
)e
0
(X
2
) + Y
2
e
2
(X
2
)e
0
(X
1
) = 0:
Consider now the nite-dimensional F
p
-algebra
B = F
p
[X
1
; X
2
; Y
1
; Y
2
]=(E
1
; E
2
; F
1
; F
2
; Y
2
1
  f(X
1
); Y
2
2
  f(X
2
)):
In a generic situation, the minimal polynomial of  (X
1
+ X
2
) in B is then
precisely the polynomial R
1
that appears in the Grobner basis of I
`
(failures
could occur, e.g., if there exists an `-torsion divisor D = P
1
+P
2
, such that [`]P
1
is not of weight 2). We will see below that the whole Grobner basis of I
`
is not
necessary to the point-counting application we have in mind. Thus, we can start
by working with the rst two equations E
1
; E
2
, which involve X
1
; X
2
only.
These polynomials were already considered in [11]. The strategy used in that
paper consisted in computing the resultant of E
1
; E
2
with respect to X
2
for a
start, from which it was possible to deduce the coordinates of [`]-torsion divisors.
This approach did not take into account the symmetry in (X
1
; X
2
); we now show
how to work directly in Mumford's coordinates U
1
=  (X
1
+X
2
); U
0
= X
1
X
2
,
so as to compute resultants of lower degrees.
3.2 Resymmetrisation
The polynomials E
1
(X
1
; X
2
) and E
2
(X
1
; X
2
) are symmetric polynomials. It is
well known that they can be expressed in terms of the two elementary symmetric
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polynomials X
1
X
2
and X
1
+X
2
. The heart of Mumford's representation is the
use of this expression, but this had been broken in order to apply Cantor's divi-
sion polynomials. We call resymmetrisation the method that we present now to
come back to a representation of bivariate polynomials in terms of the elemen-
tary symmetric polynomials. This is not as trivial as it seems, since the naive
schoolbook method to symmetrize a polynomial yields a complexity jump in our
case.
Let us consider the unique polynomials E
1
and E
2
in F
p
[U
0
; U
1
] such that
E
1
(X
1
X
2
; X
1
  X
2
) = E
1
(X
1
; X
2
) and E
2
(X
1
X
2
; X
1
  X
2
) = E
2
(X
1
; X
2
)
and let R
1
2 F
p
[U
1
] be their resultant with respect to U
0
; then R
1
divides R
1
.
We want to use the following evaluation/interpolation techniques to compute
R
1
: evaluate the variable U
1
at suÆciently many scalars u
1
, compute the resul-
tants of E
1
(U
0
; u
1
) and E
2
(U
0
; u
1
), and interpolate the results. Unfortunately,
computing with E
1
and E
2
themselves has prohibitive cost, as these polyno-
mials have O(`
4
) monomials. However, their specic shape yields the following
workaround.
Let h be a polynomial in F
p
[X ] and X
1
and X
2
be two indeterminates. Then
the divided dierences of h are the bivariate symmetric polynomials
A
0
(h) =

h(X
1
) h(X
2
)

=(X
1
 X
2
) and A
1
(h) =

X
1
h(X
2
) X
2
h(X
1
)

=(X
1
 X
2
):
We let A
0
(h) and A
1
(h) be the unique polynomials in F
p
[U
0
; U
1
] such that
A
0
(h)(X
1
X
2
; X
1
 X
2
) = A
0
(h) and A
1
(h)(X
1
X
2
; X
1
 X
2
) = A
1
(h). Then
a direct computation shows that
E
1
= A
0
(d
1
) A
1
(d
2
)  A
0
(d
2
) A
1
(d
1
);
E
2
= A
0
(d
0
) A
1
(d
2
)  A
0
(d
2
) A
1
(d
0
) in F
p
[U
0
; U
1
]:
Given an arbitrary polynomial h in F
p
[X ] and u
1
2 F
p
, we show in the last
paragraphs how to compute the polynomials A
0
(h) and A
1
(h) evaluated at U
1
=
u
1
eÆciently. Taking this operation for granted, we deduce Algorithm 2 for
computing the resultant R
1
of E
1
and E
2
.
Algorithm 2 Computation of the resultant R
1
1. For deg(R
1
) + 1 dierent values of u
1
2 F
p
, do
(a) Compute A
0
(d
0
), A
1
(d
0
);A
0
(d
1
);A
1
(d
1
);A
0
(d
2
);A
1
(d
2
) evaluated at U
1
= u
1
.
(b) Deduce E
1
and E
2
, evaluated at U
1
= u
1
.
(c) Compute R
1
(u
1
) as the resultant in U
0
of E
1
and E
2
.
2. Interpolate R
1
from the pairs (u
1
; R
1
(u
1
)).
The classical estimates for the degrees of resultants imply that the degree
of R
1
is 6`
4
  17`
2
+ 12; thus to be able to perform the interpolation, it is
necessary to take at least 6`
4
  17`
2
+13 dierent values of u
1
. In practice, it is
recommended to take a few more values of u
1
, in order to check the computation.
Note that the resultant of E
1
; E
2
has degree 8`
4
  22`
2
+ 15.
We nish this subsection by detailing our solution to the problem raised
above: given u
1
in F
p
and h in F
p
[X ], how to compute the polynomials A
0
(h)
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and A
1
(h) evaluated at U
1
= u
1
eÆciently? It is immediate to check the following
identity:
h(X) = A
1
(h)(U
0
; u
1
)X + A
0
(h)(U
0
; u
1
) mod (X
2
+ u
1
X + U
0
):
Thus, the problem amounts to reduce h modulo X
2
+ u
1
X + U
0
in F
p
[U
0
][X ].
Our solution relies on the following primitive: If h is a polynomial of degree N
in F
p
[X ] and a is a scalar in F
p
, then the coeÆcients of h(X+a) can be deduced
from the coeÆcients of h(X) for one polynomial multiplication in degree N ,
see [2]. We call this primitive var-shift.
The main idea is now to rewrite the relation X
2
+u
1
X +U
0
= 0 in the form
(X + u
1
=2)
2
= u
2
1
=4 U
0
: Let Y = X + u
1
=2, and k in F
p
[X ] such that h(X) =
k(Y ): We group the coeÆcients of k according to the parity of their indices,
forming the polynomials k
odd
and k
even
such that k(Y ) = k
even
(Y
2
)+Y k
odd
(Y
2
):
Taking h modulo X
2
+ u
1
X + U
0
, we have
h(X)  k
even

u
2
1
4
  U
0

+

X +
u
1
2

k
odd

u
2
1
4
  U
0

:
Thus, computing A
0
(h) and A
1
(h) can be done by Algorithm 3 below.
Algorithm 3 Reduction of h(X) modulo X
2
+ u
1
X + U
0
in F
p
[U
0
][X ]
1. Compute k from h using var-shift.
2. Decompose k in k
odd
and k
even
.
3. Compute k
even
 
u
2
1
=4  U
0

and k
odd
 
u
2
1
=4  U
0

using var-shift.
4. Recombine their coeÆcients to get h(X) mod X
2
+ u
1
X + U
0
.
3.3 Parasites Prediction and Removal
In [11] it is shown that a factor of the resultant of E
1
; E
2
can be predicted and
used to speed-up the computation. This prediction is still possible in the context
of the resymmetrisation, and the factor of R
1
corresponding to such roots can
be computed eÆciently. The roots of this factor of R
1
are called parasites: they
are not the U
1
-coordinates of an `-torsion divisor, and actually appear as a
by-product of our elimination scheme. Thus, they can be safely factored out.
If x
1
and x
2
in F
p
cancel d
2
, then E
1
(x
1
; x
2
) = E
2
(x
1
; x
2
) = 0. The U
1
coordinates corresponding to these solutions can be written as  (x
1
+x
2
) where
x
1
and x
2
are roots of d
2
. Hence we obtain the following factor  of R
1
:
(U
1
) =
Y
d
2
(x
1
)=0
Y
d
2
(x
2
)=0
(U
1
+ x
1
+ x
2
):
The factor  is a parasite, as generically it does not lead to any `-torsion divisor.
Then  divides R
1
but not R
1
, so we lose nothing in eliminating it from R
1
. The
polynomial  is computed using an algorithm of [4] dedicated to such questions.
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Then Step 2. in Algorithm 2 is replaced by the interpolation of R
1
= from the
pairs (u
1
; R
1
(u
1
)=(u
1
)).
The degree of  is 4`
4
 12`
2
+9, so the degree of R
1
= is 2`
4
 5`
2
+3, reducing
by a factor of about 3 the number of values of u
1
that have to be considered
in Algorithm 2. As an output, we now have at our disposal the polynomial
R
1
= R
1
=, which is a multiple of R
1
. For comparison, the resultant computed
in [11] has degree 4`
4
  10`
2
+ 6, which is twice the degree of R
1
.
3.4 Factorization and Reconstruction of a Torsion Element
Once the resultant R
1
has been computed, the task is not nished: indeed, what
we want is the representation of an `-torsion divisor, so that we can plug it
into the equation of the Frobenius endomorphism. Here, there are two possible
strategies:
1. Rene R
1
to get exactly R
1
and reconstruct from it the whole Grobner basis
of I
`
describing a generic `-torsion divisor.
2. Look for small degree factors of R
1
, check if they are indeed factors of R
1
and deduce the corresponding `-torsion divisors.
By analogy with Schoof's algorithm for elliptic curves, one would think that
the rst choice is the most pertinent. However, reningR
1
into R
1
can be a costly
task, and if there exist indeed small factors of R
1
, then the second solution is
faster. That is the reason why we chose the second solution in our experiments
described below. However, especially for ` = 17 or 19, we could feel the limit
of this choice. Therefore, for larger computations, we should probably switch to
the rst solution.
We now describe the second strategy with more details.
Let u
1
be a root of R
1
in an extension F
q
of F
p
. We evaluate the polynomials
E
1
and E
2
at (X
1
; u
1
 X
1
) in F
q
[X
1
], and obtain two univariate polynomials
in F
q
[X
1
]. Their GCD is (generically) a polynomial of degree 2 which might, or
not, be the u-polynomial of an `-torsion divisor. To settle the question, we take
into account the last two equations F
1
and F
2
, and check that our candidate u-
polynomial is compatible with them. If not, we try again and select another root
of R
1
. Otherwise, we deduce the v-polynomial, and build an `-torsion divisor de-
ned over F
q
. It is then plugged into all possible candidates for the characteristic
polynomial (T ) mod ` to detect the right one.
We now concentrate on the problem of nding irreducible factors of R
1
,
using classical ingredients of polynomial factorization. It is interesting to nd
the factors of small degree rst, as it reduces the subsequent computation. Thus,
we start by detecting the linear factors, given by gcd(X
p
  X;R
1
(X)). If this
GCD is non-trivial, then the corresponding roots are separated and processed
before maybe continuing the factorization. Then factors of degree d are detected
for increasing d by computing gcd(X
p
d
 X;R
1
(X)), and when we nd a root, it
is used to try to build an `-torsion divisor that perhaps determines (T ) mod `.
This can be improved using the fact that the factorization pattern of R
1
is
partly predictable. Indeed, due to the Galois structure induced by the group
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law in J(C), some factorization patterns are forbidden. We can then proceed as
follows: we rst precompute the list of all possible patterns corresponding to `
and p, and we start looking for irreducible factors by increasing degree as before.
At each step, the number of factors we nd eliminates some patterns in the list.
Then we look in the remaining patterns for the next smallest possible degree
and try directly to catch factors of that degree. If there is a large gap between
the current degree and the next one, the Baby-step/Giant-step strategy of [30]
using modular compositions can yield a signicant speed-up compared to the
classical powering algorithm.
As another application of the factorization patterns, we mention the inuence
of the choice of p: if p = 1 mod `, then we can infer that the smallest irreducible
factor of R
1
has degree at most (`
2
+ 1)=2, compared to possibly O(`
4
) in the
general case. We do not give details on the determination of the possible patterns
for lack of space. The idea is similar to the one used in [12] for modular equations.
3.5 Complexity
We start by evaluating the cost in F
p
-operations of one iteration of Step 1 in
Algorithm 2. Using Algorithm 3, the cost of computing A
0
(d
0
), A
1
(d
0
), A
0
(d
1
),
A
1
(d
1
), A
0
(d
2
), A
1
(d
2
) is O(M(`
2
)), since the d
i
have degree O(`
2
). Deducing
E
1
and E
2
involves 4 more multiplications of polynomials of degree O(`
2
) at a
cost of O(M(`
2
)). The resultant of E
1
and E
2
can then be computed using the
HGCD algorithm at a cost of O(M(`
2
) log `).
Hence the resultant computation is dominating this step; this would not
have been the case without the var-shift strategy. The loop in Step 1 must be
repeated for O(`
4
) dierent values of u
1
, so the cost of Step 1 is O(`
4
M(`
2
) log `)
operations in F
p
. Step 2 is a degree O(`
4
) polynomial interpolation, which can
be done using O(M(`
4
) log `) operations in F
p
.
We now evaluate the inuence of the parasite prediction on the complexity.
The polynomial  is computed using the algorithm of [4] at a cost of O(M(`
4
))
operations. Then its evaluations at the O(`
4
) dierent values of u
1
can be de-
duced using O(M(`
4
) log `) operations in F
p
. Therefore, the cost of precomputing
the eect of the parasite factor is negligible compared to the cost of computing
R
1
.
Knowing the values of  on the dierent values of u
1
allows to interpolate
a polynomial of degree 3 times less. This yields a speed-up by a factor at least
3 (and even more in practice, depending on the function M). Also the input of
the factorization step is 3 times smaller, thus gaining a constant factor in that
phase.
The factorization phase is less easy to analyze, since its complexity varies
quite a lot depending on the degrees of the smallest irreducible factors. Denote
by d the degree of the smallest factor of R
1
that allows to deduce (T ) mod `.
By the powering algorithm, computing gcd(X
p
d
 X;R
1
(X)) can be done using
O((d log p+log `)M(`
4
)) operations in F
p
and isolating one of the factors of degree
d has similar expected complexity. From an irreducible factor of degree d, the
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reconstruction of an `-torsion divisor D dened over F
p
d
requires to manipulate
polynomials of degree O(`
2
) over F
p
d , so it costs O(M(d`
2
) log `) operations in
F
p
.
Finally, the detection of the invalid choices for (s
1
; s
2
) mod ` requires 4 ap-
plications of the Frobenius endomorphism to D and O(`) group operations in
J(C=F
p
d ), that is O((` log d+ log p)M(d)) operations in F
p
.
If d is small enough (say d = O(`)), this factoring strategy is satisfactory
since its complexity is not worse than computing R
1
, if log p is not too large.
However, if d is O(`
4
), then the above complexity estimate of the factoring step
is catastrophic. Using the known factorization patterns is useful in this context,
even if the precise analysis is complicated. We expect that working with the whole
ideal I
`
(thus avoiding the factorization) is more suited for a proper analysis;
cleaning all details of that approach is out of the scope of this article.
4 Computation modulo small prime powers
Given a prime `, from the knowledge of an `-torsion divisor in J(C), one can de-
duce `
2
-torsion divisors by performing a division by ` in the Jacobian; iterating
this process yields divisors of `
3
-torsion, `
4
-torsion, . . . This can be used within
Schoof's algorithm, so as to obtain modular information on the polynomial (T )
modulo `, `
2
, and so on. As appears below, there are many computational diÆ-
culties to overcome before this can be eÆciently applied in practice. We mostly
dedicated our eorts on the case ` = 2, improving the techniques of [11], and
spend much of this section describing this case. We thereafter briey describe
the case ` = 3.
In the case ` = 2, this lifting strategy was already used in [11]. It starts from
the data of a 2-torsion divisor; then the iterative step is as follows. Suppose that
a divisor D
k
of 2
k
-torsion is given; we denote by F
q
the extension of the base
eld F
p
over which D
k
is dened. We make the assumption that D
k
has weight
2, and write D
k
= hx
2
+ u
1
x+ u
0
; v
1
x+ v
0
i.
There are exactly 2
4
= 16 divisors D such that [2]D = D
k
. Let us make
the genericity assumption that all these divisors have weight 2, and introduce
4 indeterminates U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
to denote the coordinates of D. Using doubling
formulas coming from Cantor's addition algorithm, we obtain a system F
k
that
relates D and D
k
:
F
k








H
1
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = u
1
; G
1
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = 0;
H
2
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = u
0
; G
2
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = 0;
H
3
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = v
1
;
H
4
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = v
0
;
where H
1
; H
2
; H
3
; H
4
are rational functions, and G
1
; G
2
are polynomials which
specify that x
2
+U
1
x+U
0
divides (V
1
x+V
0
)
2
 f . Cleaning denominators, we are
left with a polynomial system in U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
, with u
1
; u
;
v
1
; v
0
as parameters.
We make the further genericity assumption that the ideal generated by F
k
admits
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a Grobner basis of the form
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
V
0
  L
0
(U
1
)
V
1
  L
1
(U
1
)
U
0
 M
0
(U
1
)
M
1
(U
1
);
where M
1
2 F
q
[U
1
] has degree 16 and L
0
; L
1
;M
0
have degree at most 15. Since
D
k
is 2
k
-torsion, this provides a description of 16 divisors of 2
k+1
-torsion.
The next step is to factorize the polynomial M
1
in F
q
[U
1
]. Any factor of M
1
can be used to try and determine the characteristic polynomial  mod 2
k+1
, but
some of them might give no information. Let r be one irreducible factor of lowest
degree that allows the determination of  mod 2
k+1
, n its degree, and u
1
a root
of r in F
q
n
. Then the divisor D
k+1
= hx
2
+ u
1
x+M
0
(u
1
); L
1
(u
1
)x + L
0
(u
1
)i is
of 2
k+1
-torsion. It can be used for the next loop of the algorithm.
From the computational point of view, the main tasks to perform at the
kth step are the following: First, solve a zero-dimensional polynomial system of
the form [2]D = D
k
, then factorize a polynomial of degree 16. The following
subsections detail our contributions on these questions. It should be clear that
these computations are done with polynomials dened over an extension F
q
of
the base eld F
p
, whose possibly high degree is the main cause of concern.
4.1 Performing a Division by 2
All the systems F
k
that we consider are obtained in the same manner; as k
grows, only their right-hand sides vary. The diÆculty comes from the fact that
the eld of denition of u
1
; u
0
; v
1
; v
0
is an extension of F
p
of possibly high degree.
The solution, suggested in [11], is to solve the system F
k
for generic values
u
1
;u
0
;v
1
;v
0
. There are of course only two degrees of freedom, as x
2
+u
1
x+u
0
must divide (v
1
x+v
0
)
2
 f . Working over the base eld F
p
(u
1
;u
0
), we are thus
led to consider the system F
gen
in the unknowns v
1
;v
0
; U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
F
gen








H
1
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = u
1
; G
1
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = 0;
H
2
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = u
0
; G
2
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = 0;
H
3
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = v
1
; G
1
(u
1
;u
0
;v
1
;v
0
) = 0;
H
4
(U
1
; U
0
; V
1
; V
0
) = v
0
; G
2
(u
1
;u
0
;v
1
;v
0
) = 0;
where the last two equations express that x
2
+u
1
x+u
0
divides (v
1
x+v
0
)
2
 f .
Generically, the solutions of this system can be represented the following way:
T
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
V
0
  L
0
(U
1
;v
1
);
V
1
  L
1
(U
1
;v
1
);
U
0
 M
0
(U
1
;v
1
);
M
1
(U
1
;v
1
);
v
0
 N
1
(v
1
);
N
0
(v
1
):
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All these polynomials have coeÆcients in F
p
(u
1
;u
0
). The polynomial N
0
has
degree 4, N
1
has degree less than 4, M
1
has degree 16 in U
1
and less than 4 in
v
1
and L
0
; L
1
;M
0
have degree less than 16 (resp. 4) in U
1
(resp. v
1
).
Systems like F
gen
that involve free variables are diÆcult to handle. A direct
application of a Grobner basis algorithm over F
p
(u
1
;u
0
) fails by lack of memory,
so we used the algorithm of [28], dedicated to such situations, to compute T .
Once T is known, it can be specialized on the coordinates of the divisor D
k
,
realizing its division by 2.
The solution presented in [11] followed the same approach, with a notable
dierence: instead of considering the representation T , another representation
was used, which involved polynomials of degree 64. Our approach reduces this
degree to 16, and makes the subsequent computations much easier.
In terms of complexity, the polynomials dening the system F
gen
have degree
bounded independently from p; thus, computing T takes a bounded number of
operations in F
p
. Next, at each division step, we must specialize u
1
;u
0
;v
1
;v
0
on the coordinate of the divisor D
k
in T . If D
k
is dened in a degree d extension
of F
p
, then this substitution requires O(M(d)) operations in F
p
.
4.2 Factorization using the Action of the 2-Torsion
After performing the division by 2, we are left with a description of the solution
set V
k
of the system F
k
by means of the following representation:
M
1
(U
1
) = 0; U
0
=M
0
(U
1
); V
1
= L
1
(U
1
); V
0
= L
0
(U
1
)
Now, we have to factorize the polynomial M
1
2 F
q
[U
1
]. It has degree 16, which
is moderate; the main issue is the degree of F
q
over its prime eld: in the com-
putations presented below, F
q
had degree up to 1280 on its prime eld. We now
show how to simplify this factorization, using the natural action of the 2-torsion
group J(C)[2] on V
k
; in the spirit of [14].
Let us see U
1
as a coordinate function on the set of weight 2 divisors (the
choice of U
1
is arbitrary, but makes the computation easier). To any subgroup G
of J(C)[2], we associate the averaging operator S
G
: D 7!
P
g2G
U
1
(D+g), which
is dened as soon as all divisors D + g have weight 2. Now, G acts on V
k
, and
each orbit has cardinality jGj. The function S
G
takes constant values on each
orbit, so it takes at most [J(C)[2] : G] distinct values on V
k
. By an additional
genericity assumption, we may suppose that S
G
takes precisely [J(C)[2] : G]
distinct values on V
k
.
To realize this algebraically, let us introduce the \divisor" D
0
= hx
2
+U
1
x+
M
0
; L
1
x + L
0
i; dened over F
q
[U
1
]=M
1
. Given any 2-torsion divisor g, we can
apply the addition formulas to D
0
and g, performing all operations in F
q
[U
1
]=M
1
(the addition formulas require divisions, but if one of them fails it gives a proper
factor of M
1
). We obtain a \divisor" D
g
= hx
2
+ U
(g)
1
x + U
(g)
0
; V
(g)
1
x + V
(g)
0
i,
where U
(g)
1
; U
(g)
0
; V
(g)
1
; V
(g)
0
are in F
q
[U
1
]=M
1
; by construction, if D is any divisor
in V
k
, then the U
1
-coordinate of D+g is obtained by evaluating U
(g)
1
on the U
1
-
coordinate of D. Let thus s
G
=
P
g2G
U
(g)
1
2 F
q
[U
1
]=M
1
. Then for any D 2 V
k
,
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the value S
G
(D) is obtained by evaluating s
G
on the U
1
-coordinate of D. From
the above discussion on the function S
G
, we deduce that the minimal polynomial
of s
G
in F
q
[U
1
]=M
1
has degree [J(C)[2] : G].
As an abstract group, J(C)[2] is isomorphic to (Z=2Z)
4
. Let us consider sub-
groups
G
1
' (Z=2Z) G
2
' (Z=2Z)
2
 G
3
' (Z=2Z)
3
 J(C)[2] ' (Z=2Z)
4
:
Using the above construction, we associate to these subgroups the elements s
1
,
s
2
, s
3
of F
q
[U
1
]=M
1
. Introducing their minimal polynomials, we deduce that the
extension F
q
! F
q
[U
1
]=M
1
is isomorphic to the quotient of F
p
[U
1
; S
1
; S
2
; S
3
] by
some polynomials
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
T
U
(U
1
; S
1
; S
2
; S
3
)
T
1
(S
1
; S
2
; S
3
)
T
2
(S
2
; S
3
)
T
3
(S
3
);
where all polynomials have degree 2 in their main variables, resp. S
3
; S
2
; S
1
; U
1
.
Using this decomposition, we avoid the factorization of M
1
: We start by fac-
torizing T
3
over F
q
, and adjoin one of its roots to F
q
; then we factor T
2
over
this new eld, and so on. Thus, only the computation of T
3
; T
2
; T
1
; T
U
and four
square root extractions are needed.
Suppose that q = p
d
; then all polynomials T
3
; T
2
; T
1
; T
U
can be computed
in O(M(d)) operations in F
p
. For square-root extraction, we used a factoriza-
tion algorithm quite similar to those of [33] and [17]. Using such algorithms,
the expected complexity of extracting a square root in F
p
d is O(C(d) log(d) +
M(d) log(p)) operations in F
p
, where C(d) denotes the cost of modular composi-
tion in degree d, so that C(d) 2 O(d
2
+
p
dM(d)), see [6]. One should note that
this whole process only saves a constant factor over the factorization ofM
1
from
scratch; however, it was quite signicant in practice.
In the worst case, after k lifting steps, the degree d might be of order O(16
k
).
In this case, taking into account all previous estimates, the expected complexity
to obtain a 2
k
-torsion is expected to be in O(kC(16
k
)+M(16
k
) log(p)) base eld
operations. However, our experiments showed that with a surprising amount
of uniformity, the degree of this extension was actually in O(2
k
), so the above
complexity bound was by far overestimated.
4.3 Performing a Division by 3
Most of what was described above extends mutatis mutandis to arbitrary `.
Nevertheless, the computations become much more diÆcult: even for ` = 3, we
did not solve the system describing the division of a generic divisor by 3. Thus,
we used the plain strategy to divide torsion divisors by 3, by means of successive
Grobner bases computations, over extensions of F
p
of increasing degrees. As
the tables below reveal, the time required for solving these polynomial systems
makes this approach much more delicate than for 2-torsion. As a consequence,
we did not implement the equivalent of our improved factorization process, and
used a plain factorization strategy.
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5 Implementation and Experiments
We implemented a whole point-counting algorithm including all the above-
mentioned improvements and the MCT algorithm [21], rst within the Magma
computer algebra system [3]. Then, the critical parts of the computation modulo
small primes and the MCT algorithm were implemented in C++ using the NTL
library [29]. The communication between dierent parts of the program is done
using les for small communications or named pipes in the case of a heavy in-
teraction. For instance, the analysis of the factorization pattern of the resultant
R
1
is implemented in a Magma program that sends elementary factoring tasks
(like a modular composition) to a running NTL program.
To test our program we ran it on several randomly chosen curves dened over
F
p
with p = 5  10
24
+ 8503491, with the hope to nd some cryptographically
secure Jacobians. An early abort strategy was used to eliminate curves C for
which either the Jacobian order or the Jacobian order of the twisted curve was
discovered to be non-prime. In particular, f must be irreducible to ensure the
oddity of the group orders.
We have computed the characteristic polynomials of 32 randomly chosen
curves, that yield 64 group orders, taking into account the twists. Due to the
early abort strategy, these group orders are not divisible by any prime less than
or equal to 19. Among them, 7 were found to be primes, meaning that the
corresponding Jacobians are secure against all known attacks. One particular
curve has the nice feature that both itself and its twist have a prime order
Jacobian. The data for that curve can be found in the appendix.
Table 1 gives statistics for the runtimes of the dierent steps of the algorithm.
They are given in seconds on a Pentium IV at 2.26 GHz having 1 GB of central
memory. Due to the early abort strategy, the statistics for the factoring phase
are made on less curves for larger `, e.g., 39 curves for ` = 5, versus 21 curves for
` = 19. More curves were computed on dierent computers and were not taken
into account for the statistics.
The modular composition used for factorization is done using Brent and
Kung's algorithm [6]. For ` = 17 and ` = 19, the precomputation (Baby steps)
is not balanced with the Giant steps due to memory constraints. This explains
why the runtimes for those values look so bad compared to other values.
As for the torsion lifting, 2-torsion was much easier to handle than 3-torsion,
as we computed divisors of order 1024 = 2
10
, versus 27 = 3
3
only. The curves we
used were selected so that they have 8-torsion dened over F
p
10
and 3-torsion
dened over F
p
4
. Then in almost all cases, the 2
i
-torsion divisors, i  3, were
dened in extensions of degrees 10; 20; 40; 80; : : : , and the 3
i
-torsion divisors in
extensions of degrees 4; 12; 36; : : :
After the modular computations, we know (T ) mod 44696171520 = 2
10

3
3
 5  7  11  13  17  19 ; for comparison's sake, note that in [11], the modular
computation went to 3843840 = 2
8
3 5 7 11 13. To conclude; we run the MCT
algorithm. Due to memory requirements, we used a Xeon at 2.66 GHz with 2
GB of memory; this computation takes about 3 hours and 1.7 GB per curve.
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Computations Modulo Small Primes
` 5 7 11 13 17 19 Theory
generic degree of R
1
1,128 4,560 28,680 56,280 165,600 258,840 2`
4
  5`
2
+ 3
generic degree of  2,209 9,025 57,121 112,225 330,625 516,961 4`
4
  12`
2
+ 9
Time computing  0.3 2 23 52 256 374 O(M(`
4
) log `)
Time Step 1, Algo 1 6.5 63 1,504 5,072 34,869 69,162 O(`
4
M(`
2
) log `)
Time Step 2, Algo 1 0.3 2 17 39 182 275 O(M(`
4
) log `)
Total time Algo 1 7.1 67 1,544 5,163 35,307 69,811
Time X
p
mod R
1
3.3 15 77 280 2,251 2,294 O(M(`
4
) log p)
Time Prec. Mod Comp 0.8 8 105 525 3,267 2,122 O(`
2
M(`
4
))
Time Apply Mod Comp 1.1 11 225 976 20,768 51,710 O(`
8
+ `
2
M(`
4
))
Factoring Time (Min) 12.5 59 524 1,055 23,537 15,061
Factoring Time (Max) 61 353 5,021 23,083 206,860 359,330
Factoring Time (Avg) 42 193 2,700 9,415 117,785 145,734
2- and 3- Torsion Lifting
Torsion Total Time (Min) Total Time (Max) Total Time (Avg)
27 10,901 11,317 11,511
1024 71,421 103,433 90,071
Lifting to 1024-torsion
Details for a sample curve
Generic Resolution: 5,104 sec
Torsion Degree Specialization Factor Deducing 
8 10 1 12 1
16 20 1 37 3
32 40 3 178 16
64 80 15 543 50
128 160 41 1,423 146
256 320 115 4,627 459
512 640 390 16,776 1,602
1024 1280 1301 58,408 6,590
Lifting to 27-torsion
Details for a sample curve
Torsion 9 27
Degree 12 36
Grobner 745 3,811
Factor 914 5,917
Deducing  3 19
Table 1. Runtimes in seconds for the torsion computation on a 2.26 GHz Pentium IV.
Putting all this together, a complete point-counting for a random curve over F
p
takes on average about 1 week.
For comparison, in the record-curve computation in [11] the Schoof-like part
was used up to ` = 13. Just the modulo 13 computation had taken 205 hours
on a Pentium II at 450 MHz. A crude estimation gives a runtime of about 40
hours on the same computer as the one we used in this paper. This has to be
compared with the 4 hour runtime that we obtained with our improvements and
our new implementation.
Are the curves \random"? In our computer experiments, the \pure random-
ness" is biased in several places. Due to the cryptographical requirements, the
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group order must be prime, so \random curve" should be understood as random
among the curves with prime order Jacobians, but that is standard. Also a bias
is introduced by our early abort strategy on both the curve and its twist.
A more important bias is in the choice of p. We choose a prime which is
congruent to 1 modulo all the small primes ` for which we do the Schoof com-
putation. This was meant to speed-up the factorization of the resultant R
1
, as
mentioned in Section 3.4. This dependency of the runtime of the algorithm in the
form of p can be avoided by working in the formal algebra instead of factoring.
In fact, in more recent versions of our software, we implemented this and the
runtimes are slightly better for large `. Hence, this bias could be removed.
The last bias that we introduced is the particular shape of the 8- and 3-
torsion that we imposed. The goal was mostly to have the same kind of behav-
ior for all the curves with respect to the division by 2 and by 3. Indeed, the
division algorithms rely on Grobner basis computations and are very hard to
implement and to debug. The technical diÆculty of handling our computation
on many computers, with interactions between Magma and NTL led us to add
this simplication that made our code more reliable.
Our NTL implementation of the Schoof-like part has been made freely avail-
able [9]. The Magma implementation of the division algorithms is not stable
enough to be exported in the present state.
6 Conclusion and Perspectives
In this paper, we have detailed algorithms used to compute the cardinalities of
Jacobians dened over prime elds of order about 10
24
. Most of our attention was
aimed at improving the techniques for torsion computation introduced in [11].
We expect more improvements to be possible. For instance, for torsion index
about 17 or 19, the factorization strategy of Subsection 3.4 becomes lengthy,
and comparative tests with other strategies are necessary, possibly using the
modular equations of [12]. Also, our techniques for lifting the 3-torsion are still
quite crude, as we would like it to be as eÆcient as that of 2-torsion. We have
designed a birthday paradox version of the MCT algorithm, to be described
elsewhere [13], that loses a constant factor in runtime but is highly parallelizable
and requires almost no memory. In future work, we also plan to use it on top of
our torsion computation algorithms.
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Appendix: A cryptographically secure curve
Let C be dened by y
2
= f(x) over F
p
with p = 5 10
24
+ 8503491, and
f(x) = x
5
+ 2682810822839355644900736x
3
+ 226591355295993102902116x
2
+
2547674715952929717899918x+ 4797309959708489673059350:
Then its characteristic polynomial is (T ) = T
4
  s
1
T
3
+ s
2
T
2
  ps
1
T + p
2
,
where
s
1
= 1173929286783 and s
2
= 4402219446392186881834853:
Thus the cardinality of its Jacobian is
N
J
= (1) = 24999999999994130438600999402209463966197516075699;
which is a 164-bit prime number. Furthermore the quadratic twist of C has a
Jacobian with group order
N
e
J
= ( 1) = 25000000000005869731468829402229428962794965968171;
which is also a prime number.
